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4.1  Introduction 
This paper investigates on a yearly panel of 20 OECD countries the role of 
fragmentation in decision making as a determinant of fiscal outcomes. 
In  very  broad terms, fragmentation arises when several agents or groups 
participate in the fiscal decision-making process, each with its own interests 
and constituency to satisfy, and each with some weight in the final decision. 
To participate in the majority, each group demands a share in the budget; as all 
groups do this, the end result is a high level of expenditure or a large deficit.’ 
At this level of generality, the view that fragmentation is responsible for the 
high levels of expenditure and deficits observed in industrialized countries in 
the last 25 years is widely held in both academic and policy circles. Yet, when it 
comes to empirically testing this notion, one quickly realizes that conceptually 
fragmentation can take many forms, and each concept can be measured in 
many ways. Some theoretical guidance is needed. 
As we  argue in Kontopoulos and Perotti 1997, fragmentation of the fiscal 
policy decision-making process is closely related to the notion of internaliza- 
tion of the costs of  fiscal policy. High expenditure and possibly high deficits 
result when individual policymakers do not fully internalize the costs of aggre- 
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1. In its basic form, this intuition has been first formalized in the static “common pool” models 
of Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen (1981) and Shepsle and Weingast (1981), and subsequently 
extended in numerous papers.  See Alesina and Perotti  1995 and Velasco 1995 for a survey of 
this literature. 
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gate expenditure and the associated taxation. This occurs because the expendi- 
ture proposed by each agent in the majority can be closely targeted to the group 
he  or  she represents,  while  revenues  with  their  distortionary  costs can  be 
spread over a large number of groups. 
Two key factors determine how much each agent in the majority internalizes 
the costs of the fiscal outcome: the number of decision makers participating in 
the process and the rules that govern the aggregation of preferences, that is, 
the set of procedures whereby a final decision is arrived at. As the number of 
decision makers gets larger, each will pay a smaller share of the revenue costs 
of each dollar of expenditure he or she proposes; the marginal cost of expendi- 
ture to each policymaker falls, and in equilibrium each will propose a higher 
expenditure. As a result, aggregate expenditure will also increase. The budget 
process is the second important determinant because it determines the game 
played by decision makers. For example, if the finance minister sets the total 
size of expenditure first, theoretically he or she is in a position to better inter- 
nalize the costs of  aggregate expenditure, and individual policymakers can 
only bargain over the distribution of this expenditure. At the other extreme, if 
the budget is just the sum of bids made by  individual ministers, without any 
coordination from the top, the degree of internalization of the costs of expendi- 
ture will be at a minimum. 
In this paper, we focus on the first determinant, the number of decision mak- 
ers. As we show in Kontopoulos and Perotti 1997, conceptually there are two 
very different interpretations of this notion, depending on the basic decision- 
making unit one assumes. In one interpretation, the emphasis is on the legisla- 
tive side of the fiscal decision-making process. In this case, the elementary unit 
could be the individual legislator. An empirically more relevant rendition of 
this interpretation would view the party in  the ruling coalition  as the basic 
decision-making unit, on the ground that-for  the purposes of fiscal decision 
making-a  party is a more or less cohesive entity representing the interests of 
specific groups. Thus, the first measure of fragmentation we use is simply the 
number of parties in the coalition, which we also call coalition size. 
The  second  interpretation  emphasizes  the  executive  side  of  the  fiscal 
decision-making process. Hence, the elementary unit is a spending minister. 
The rationale is that each spending minister participates in the formulation of, 
and makes demands on, the overall budget. Thus, the second measure of frag- 
mentation we use is the number of spending ministers, which we also call cabi- 
net size. 
Conceptually, we see no a priori reason to privilege the first, “legislative” 
interpretation over the second, “executive” interpretation. In fact, all the mod- 
els that apply to the former-in  particular, the seminal “common pool” models 
of Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen (1981) and Shepsle and Weingast (1981) 
and their numerous extensions-can  be applied, with a simple relabeling of 
variables, to the latter. 
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the first, “legislative” interpretation of fragmentation, and almost invariably on 
a very specific variant of  this notion. In a seminal contribution, Roubini and 
Sachs (1989a,b) focused on the effects of a variable that can be termed “gov- 
ernment weakness,” assigning progressively higher scores to single-party ma- 
jority, small coalition, large coalition, and minority governments. Based on a 
sample of 20 OECD countries over the period 1960-85,  they concluded that 
deficits do tend to be positively associated with this variable. In subsequent 
research, Edin and Ohlsson (1991) found that practically all this effect was due 
to minority governments. Still later, de Haan and Sturm (1994) concluded that, 
over the period 1982-95, even this effect does not seem to be robust. Much of 
the difference in these findings seems to be due to considerable differences in 
the coding of several governments in several countries. 
We  see three main shortcomings in this exclusive emphasis on the notion of 
government weakness. First, this measure has a weak theoretical underpinning, 
and it can be unrelated to the notion of fragmentation. For instance, it is not 
clear that a minority government with many parties should be regarded as more 
fragmented than a single-party majority government. Second, it can be highly 
subjective: witness the large discrepancy in the classification between,  say, 
Roubini and Sachs (1989b) and de Haan and Sturm (1994). Third, it neglects 
entirely any notion of “executive” fragmentation. 
Thus, throughout this paper, we try to use measures of fragmentation with a 
well-defined theoretical counterpart, and as objectively measurable and quanti- 
fiable as possible. Armed with these measures, we explicitly test the two inter- 
pretations of  the notion of  fragmentation-“legislative”  and  “executive”- 
against each other. 
As we first showed in Kontopoulos and Perotti 1997, executive fragmenta- 
tion appears to be extremely important-both  economically and statistically- 
as a determinant of  fiscal outcomes. By  contrast, legislative fragmentation, 
in its various forms-government  weakness and coalition size-seems  to be 
much less important and robust. These conclusions are of potential policy rele- 
vance because the size of a cabinet is typically not a constitutional issue, and 
in fact it can vary considerably over time within each country. By contrast, the 
size of a coalition is typically the result of historical traditions and of the whole 
structure of the political process-such  as the electoral system-which  are 
often deeply grounded in the constitutional framework and in the historical 
and cultural background of a country, and therefore are much less likely to be 
amenable to change. 
Because of their potential policy relevance, it is important to check the ro- 
bustness of our basic results. This is particularly so because the conclusions of 
the literature in the tradition of Roubini and Sachs have proved to be extremely 
sensitive to the sample of countries, the sample period, the specification, the 
form of the government weakness variable (whether as separate dummy vari- 
ables or a single variable), the form of the fiscal policy variables (whether as 
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etc.), to the point that hardly any definite conclusion can be drawn with any 
reasonable degree of confidence. 
Thus, in this paper we conduct an extensive sensitivity and robustness anal- 
ysis of our basic results on “legislative” and “executive” fragmentation. As a 
consequence, we must necessarily narrow the scope of our empirical investiga- 
tion. As mentioned above, we exclude from the present investigation the role 
of procedural fragmentation, that is, of the set of rules that constitute the bud- 
get process. The effects of procedural variables have been studied on panels of 
OECD countries by  de Haan and Sturm (1994), Hallerberg and von  Hagen 
(chap. 9 in this volume), and Kontopoulos and Perotti (1997), with mixed con- 
clusions. One reason for these inconclusive results is that the budget process 
varies very  little over time, so that it is very difficult to estimate its effects 
given the small cross-sectional dimension of  the panel of OECD countries.2 
We  also exclude from our investigation the role of  fragmentation over time, 
that is, the effects of government instability and of the frequency of  govern- 
ment turnovers. Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini (1991) show that this vari- 
able seems to be positively associated with budget deficits, although here also 
there are considerable problems of definition, measurement, and robustness.3 
Our main finding is that the relationship between executive fragmentation 
(i.e., cabinet size) and fiscal outcome is indeed very robust during the seventies 
and early eighties. In the following period, it is legislative fragmentation (i.e., 
coalition size) that is more strongly related to fiscal outcomes, although this 
relationship is somewhat less robust. We  argue that these differences across 
the two periods make sense, given the different types of shocks policymakers 
faced. 
The organization of the chapter is as follows. In the next section we briefly 
describe our data set. Section 4.3 introduces the basic estimation framework 
and discusses some key aspects of it. Section 4.4 presents the basic regressions. 
In section 4.5, we perform a number of robustness and sensitivity tests on our 
benchmark regressions. Section 4.6 concludes. 
4.2  The Data 
Our database includes 20 countries and covers the period 1960-95.4 In this 
section, we describe the fiscal and political variables. 
All the budget data we use refer to the general government and come, with 
a few exceptions mentioned later, from the OECD Economic Outlook and Na- 
tional Income Account data sets. The available data sets contain several gaps, 
2. The empirical literature on the effects of procedural variables in U.S. states is much larger, 
and growing. For a survey, see Poterba 1994 and Inman 1996. 
3. Estimating the effects of fragmentation over time poses problems similar to those of proce- 
dural fragmentation: the frequency of government turnover must be measured over time, and there- 
fore one essentially ends up with cross-sectional estimates. 
4.  The countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, Sweden, United 
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mainly due to the shift from the old to the new system of national accounts in 
many OECD countries during the seventies. We combine the two sets of data 
to fill most of the gaps without sacrificing comparability of the data. In a few 
country-years, the two data sets mentioned above were supplemented with data 
from two other sources: the Revenue Statistics of OECD Member Countries, 
and EUROSTAT’s National Income Accounts. Both these data sets also follow 
the guidelines of the new system of national accounts and are usually identical 
to the other two sources when they overlap. Perotti 1998 contains more details 
on the construction of this data set. As a result of these amendments, the data 
set contains consistent series on the primary deficit and all its major compo- 
nents covering all the years 1960-95  for all the 20 countries in the sample, 
with the exception of 23 country-years. 
To  preserve the comparability of  the definitions both over time and across 
countries, our definition of  the primary deficit is slightly different from the 
conventional one. We  define the primary deficit as the difference between ex- 
penditure and taxes, net of all net property income. On the expenditure side, 
property income comprises mainly interests, but on the revenues side it also 
comprises items like rents and the “operating surplus” of the government that 
are normally included in the definition of the primary deficit. These items seem 
to be less consistently defined across countries, and the breakdown between 
interest and other property income is not available before 1970. We  also ex- 
clude capital transfers paid by the government from the expenditure side, and 
current and capital transfers received by the government on the revenue side. 
These three items have a rather spotty coverage in the databases that we use, 
particularly for the 1960s and for some countries, so that their inclusion would 
have introduced substantial breaks in the series and in the consistency of the 
definitions; in any case, these items are typically very small and therefore are 
unlikely to affects our results ~ubstantially.~  In addition, there is no reason to 
expect that their exclusion biases the year-to-year movements in fiscal out- 
comes-on  which we focus in our paper-in  any particular direction. 
We used three principles in constructing our political data. First, because we 
have a precise definition of fragmentation, we concentrate on measuring its two 
interpretations-“legislative”  and “executive”-as  directly as possible; that is, 
we try to construct the variable that most immediately captures each compo- 
nent of the definition of fragmentation. Second, while some element of subjec- 
tivity is unavoidable when political variables are involved, we focus on quanti- 
fiable measures as much as possible. In classifying these governments, we rely 
exclusively on external sources (from the political science literature mostly) 
that were also cross-checked several times. Third, we exert a specific effort to 
match the political variables with fiscal data by  tracking the investiture date 
and thus the duration of the governments, so that we can establish an accurate 
connection between the institutional framework and the fiscal policy outcome. 
5.  Recall that our fiscal variables refer to the general government, and  therefore all intergovern- 
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To classify governments, we must first define them. With annual data, it is not 
always obvious how to associate the fiscal outcome of  a given calendar year 
with a specific type of government. We follow two criteria. First, we exclude 
all governments with a duration of less than 60 days, under the assumption that 
they are too short-lived to have any influence on fiscal outcomes. Second, we 
pay particular attention to the month of investiture of a government. Because 
of the long decision and implementation lags, a new government that is formed 
toward the end of a year is most likely irrelevant for the fiscal results of that 
year. Hence, we assume that only governments  that were formed before the 
beginning of August of any given year have any significant impact on the fiscal 
outcome of that year. Obviously, this cutoff point is somewhat arbitrary; hence, 
we also run our regressions with three different cutoff dates (June, July, Sep- 
tember). Since the results are robust to these variations,  we present only one 
set of  results in order to economize on space. When there is more than one 
government before August, all lasting longer than two months, we average the 
characteristics of the governments of that year, with weights equal to the dura- 
tion of each government.6 
In the following two subsections, we briefly describe the construction of the 
two political variables. 
4.2.1 
As we discuss above, one key criterion in our investigation is to use a direct 
and unambiguous measure of  the two notions of fragmentation that we are 
investigating. The measure of coalition size that most closely matches its defi- 
nition  is just the  total  number of parties in the coalition, which we denote 
“NPC.” 
The primary  source for this  variable  is Woldendorp,  Keman, and Budge 
1993, a special issue of  the European Journal of Political Research  (EJPR) 
with a wealth of  information on each government in parliamentary democra- 
cies in the postwar period. The data set has been updated annually. The United 
States, Greece, Portugal, and Spain are not covered in the EJPR databa~e;~  the 
first, because it is a presidential system; the latter three, because in the initial 
parts of the period they were not run by democratic regimes. For these coun- 
tries, we used the Europa Yearbook (EY), an annual publication with informa- 
tion on each country in the world and its government. 
Number of Parties in Coalition (NPC) 
4.2.2  Number of Spending Ministers (NSM) 
The most immediate measure of the notion of  cabinet size that descends 
from the discussion in the introductory section is simply the number of spend- 
ing ministers. We construct this variable as the sum of the following ministers: 
(i) industry, trade, or ministers with related  or subdivided competencies like 
6. In another robustness exercise we also ran the bulk of our regressions with a data set that 
included all governments irrespective of their duration and averaged (weighted) their characteris- 
tics in each year. This somewhat agnostic procedure did not significantly alter any of  our results. 
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foreign trade,  commerce, and  state  industries  (if  not  attributed to  public 
works-see  next); (ii) public works, infrastructure, or ministers with related 
or subdivided competencies like (public) transportation, energy, post, telecom- 
munications, merchant marine, civil aviation, national resources, construction 
(if not specifically attributed to housing-see  below), urban development, and 
so forth;  (iii)  defense; (iv) justice;  (v) labor;  (vi) education; (vii) health; 
(viii) housing; (ix) agriculture. We also add all ministers with economics port- 
folios: (x) finance or ministers with related or subdivided competencies like 
First Lord of the Treasury, budget, taxation, and so on; (xi) economic affairs 
or ministers with related or subdivided competencies like (regional) economic 
planning or development, or small business. 
The primary  source for this variable is Woldendorp, Keman, and Budge 
1993. However, because this  source also reports, under each portfolio, all 
the ministers that held the same portfolio sequentially due to government re- 
shuffles, to avoid overcounting portfolios we cross-checked each entry with the 
annual volumes of the Europa Yearbook. 
4.3  Setting up the Basic Framework 
Before we can start estimating the effects of fragmentation, we need to dis- 
cuss the basic approach to estimating the model. Some of this discussion fol- 
lows Kontopoulos and Perotti 1997; therefore we will keep it at a minimum 
here. 
Our basic specification is of the following form: 
XI - X,+, =  +  a,NPC, +  a,NSM,  +  a,NPC,*DY, 
(1)  +  a,NSM,*DY,  +  a5DYl +  a6DUl +  a,=, 
+  E,, 
where XI  is a fiscal policy variable, which can be the deficit, total expenditure, 
or total revenues; DY, is the rate of growth of GDP; DU, is the change in the 
unemployment rate; INFL, is the rate of inflation of the consumer price index; 
NPC, and NSM, are the two indices of fragmentation, and are defined as the 
number of  parties in the coalition and the number of  spending ministers, re- 
spectively; NPC,*DY, and NSM,*DY, represent the interaction of these two 
indices with the rate of growth of GDP. 
Since the early contributions, virtually all empirical investigations have fo- 
cused on the effects of political and institutional variables on the deJicit. Yet, 
the theoretical case for an effect of  fragmentation on expenditure is much 
stronger than for the effects on the deficit. For instance, in the static common 
pool models B la Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen (1981) the budget is obvi- 
ously balanced. Hence, any effect of fragmentation must be on both expendi- 
tures and revenues, with no effect on the deficit. 
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should be easily generalizable to the dynamic case. Indeed, Velasco (1995) 
develops a dynamic extension of a “common pool” model where, as the num- 
ber of decision makers increases, the deficit increases. But this is the result of 
the specific functional forms assumed in the model, and there is no general 
intuition for the overall sign of  the relationship between the number of poli- 
cymakers and the deficit in the modek8  In fact, Lane and Tornell (1996) pre- 
sent a slightly different dynamic extension of a “common pool” model, where 
the relationship between the number of decision makers and the deficit is non- 
linear. Thus, in dynamic “common pool” models the presumption that frag- 
mentation leads to higher deficits does not seem to lend itself to an easy and 
general formalization. Spolaore (1993) is just about the only contribution we 
are aware of where there is a direct relationship between the number of deci- 
sion makers and the deficit, although only in response to a negative shock. 
The context, however, is slightly different-a  combination of the Alesina and 
Drazen (1991) “war of attrition” model and of the Tabellini and Alesina (1990) 
“strategic motive” for deficit. 
This discussion suggests estimating the effects of fragmentation on expendi- 
ture and revenues separately: even in theory, fragmentation might not manifest 
itself in the deficit, but only in expenditure, and limiting the investigation to 
the deficit might lead to very misleading conclusions. In addition, disaggregat- 
ing the deficit into revenues and expenditure sheds considerable light on the 
channels by  which fragmentation affects fiscal outcomes. 
This brief theoretical discussion implies that, under the null hypothesis we 
test, a1  > 0 and a3  > 0 when the dependent variable is expenditure: virtually 
all theories would imply this hypothesis. When the dependent variable is reve- 
nues, however, the existing theories offer much less guidance. Indeed, both a 
positive and a negative value for a1  and a3  can be rationalized in this case. As 
a consequence, when the dependent variable is the deficit, we expect a,  and a3 
to be positive or 0. 
In equation (l), the two political variables, NPC and NSM, appear also inter- 
acted with the rate of  growth of  GDP, DY. The interactive terms capture the 
plausible, but rarely tested, notion that political and institutional factors might 
be particularly important, as determinants of policies, in “difficult” times. This 
notion, which is part of the conventional wisdom of  policymaking, has been 
formalized in Drazen and Grilli 1993 and also plays a role in Spolaore 1993 
and Velasco 1995; more discursive treatments and short historical discussion 
are in, among others, Bruno and Fischer 1993 and Tommasi and Velasco 1996. 
The hypothesis we test is that fragmentation is particularly “bad” for fiscal 
policy in “difficult” times: hence, we expect a2  < 0 and a, < 0 when the 
dependent variable is expenditure or the deficit. 
Our basic  specification also includes a number of  macroeconomic vari- 
ables-DY,,  DU, and INK,. There are two reasons for this: first, to capture 
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the effects of the macroeconomic environment on expenditure, via automatic 
mechanisms like unemployment subsidies, and on revenues, because, for in- 
stance, of the progressivity of income taxes. Second, these economic variables 
capture the reaction function of the policymaker. When the dependent variable 
is aggregate expenditure, we  expect as  < 0, a6  > 0, and a, < 0; when the 
dependent variable is revenues, we expect a5  > 0, a6  < 0, and a7  > 0. These 
are all intuitive signs for these coefficients, and we comment on them more 
extensively in Kontopoulos and Perotti 1997. 
All regressions in the benchmark  specification also include a full set of 
country and year dummies, whose role we study extensively in section 4.5. 
Finally, all the fiscal policy variables we use in this paper are cyclically 
unadjusted and are expressed as changes in GDP shares. In Kontopoulos and 
Perotti 1997, we use cyclically adjusted fiscal variables. There are advantages 
and disadvantages in both strategies. In testing the effects of political and insti- 
tutional factors, presumably one is interested only in the noncyclical changes 
in  fiscal  policy.  This  calls  for  using  cyclically  adjusted  figures  only  if 
(i) political and institutional variables are correlated with cyclical conditions, 
and (ii) controlling for GR, DU, and INFL is insufficient, for instance because 
the elasticity of fiscal outcomes to growth differs across countries. On the other 
hand, cyclically adjusted figures are provided by  international organizations 
only from 1973 at the earliest, and there is no commonly accepted methodol- 
ogy to cyclically adjust fiscal outcomes, so that all figures involve a large de- 
gree of  subjectivity and may well involve some additional noise. In addition, 
using unadjusted GDP shares allows us a more direct comparison with existing 
results, since this is the definition that has been used in most of the literature. 
4.4  Basic Results 
Table 4.1 illustrates the basic results. Throughout the table, the dependent 
variables are the first differences in the ratio of deficit and expenditure to GDP. 
Table 4.1 delivers three main messages. First, disaggregating the deficit into 
expenditure and revenues is crucial. Looking at the first two columns, dis- 
playing regressions on the whole sample, it is clear that NSM is an important 
and very significant determinant of the deficit, and that its effects occur almost 
exclusively via aggregate expenditures9 By contrast, by  looking only at the 
deficit one would fail to detect any significant effect of NPC; this is because 
NPC affects both expenditures and revenues in the same direction, although it 
is significant only in the expenditure regression. Note that this finding might 
help explain many negative results in recent papers, like those of de Haan and 
Sturm (1994), who mostly focused on the eighties and early nineties and failed 
to detect any significant effect of the “government weakness” variable. 
9.  Obviously, the coefficient of  all variables in the revenue regression is exactly equal to the 
coefficient in the expenditure regression less the coefficient in the deficit regression. Table 4.1  Fragmentation and the Determination of Fiscal Outcome 
ADEF  AEXP  ADEF  AEXP  ADEF  AEXP  ADEF  AEXP 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
1960-95  1960-95  1960-73  1960-73  1974-83  1974-83  1984-95  1984-95 
NSM*DY  -  .02 
(-2.64) 
DY  .10 
(I  .07) 
DU  .44 
(5.60) 
INFL  -  .07 
(- 3.24) 







-  .02 
(- 1.42) 
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-  .02 
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-  .03 
(-0.96) 
.46 




















-  .08 
(-0.34) 
.38 




NPC  .06  .12  .07  .16  -  .03  -  .02  .50  .29 
(0.80)  (2.15)  (0.39)  ( 1.26)  (-0.21)  (-0.20)  (2.92)  (2.27) 
NSM  .I5  .18  -  .04  .01  .23  .24  .oa  .06 
(3.19)  (4.88)  (-0.47)  (0.08)  (2.22)  (3.25)  (0.63)  (0.63) 
NPC*DY  -.01  -  .02  -.01  -  .02  .05  .oo  -  .04  -  .04 







-  .05 
-1.11) 
.59 
N  641  641  207  207  195  195  239  239 
Note:  NPC: number of parties in coalition; NSM: number of  spending ministers; DEF: primary deficit (see text for precise definition); EXP: primary expenditure; 
REV primary revenue; DY rate of  growth of GDP DU: change in unemployment; INFL:  rate of  change of  CPI. All fiscal variables are  first differences of their 
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Second, there is indeed some evidence that both NPC and NSM are more 
important in bad than in good times. At zero GDP growth, an extra party in the 
coalition adds on average 0.12 percent of  GDP per annum to aggregate ex- 
penditure; but this effect increases by 0.02 percent of GDP for any percentage 
point of negative GDP growth, so that at 5.0 percent negative growth an extra 
party in the coalition is associated with an increase in aggregate expenditure 
by 0.22 percent of GDP. Similarly, at zero GDP growth an extra spending min- 
ister adds 0.18 percent of GDP per annum to aggregate expenditure, and 0.23 
percent at 5.0 percent negative growth. These are substantial numbers, if one 
considers that in the sample the number of parties in the coalition ranges from 
one to five, and the number of spending ministers from 5 (in Switzerland) to 
18 (in Italy). 
Third, disaggregating the whole 1960-94 period into its three main decades 
is also of crucial importance. As one would expect, political and institutional 
variables have very little effect on fiscal policy in the 1960s, a decade charac- 
terized by more or less stable growth and little fiscal action in most countries 
of the sample. The two subsequent decades show much more action, but in 
very different ways. In the seventies, the coefficient of  NSM is positive and 
highly  significant in both the deficit and expenditure regressions,  while the 
coefficient of NPC is virtually 0. In the 1980s, exactly the opposite is true (in 
addition, the coefficient of NPC is negative in the revenue regression, so that 
the coefficient in the deficit regression is virtually double that in the expendi- 
ture regression). 
This difference between the last two decades is striking, and it is so signifi- 
cant that it is unlikely to be due to chance alone. We believe the interpretation 
lies in the nature of the fiscal shocks in the two decades. In the seventies, the 
problem common to all countries was how to best contain the growth of expen- 
diture in response to an external negative shock. In the eighties, the main shock 
to fiscal policy was internal, and the dividing line was between those countries 
that engaged in large discretionary consolidations and those that did not. The 
decision to engage in a fiscal consolidation is largely political and requires a 
cohesive government agreeing on such a fundamental decision. Consequently, 
one would expect coalition  size to play a particularly  important role in the 
last decade. By contrast, in the seventies the goal-containing  the growth of 
expenditure-was  common in all countries: how well a country could attain it 
depended, among other things, on how the executive decision-making process 
was organized. Hence, one would expect cabinet size to matter particularly in 
this decade. 
These are the three basic results of our approach. In the next section, we 
start exploring their robustness. Because, as we have shown, virtually nothing 
is significant in the regressions for the sixties, from now on we will concentrate 
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4.5  Robustness and Sensitivity 
4.5.1  The Role of Country and Time-Fixed Effects 
In table 4.2, we explore the role of  country  and year dummies. This is a 
particularly important issue given our sample and the nature of the estimation 
problem. The macroeconomic shocks that influence fiscal outcomes are likely 
to be highly correlated across countries. Year dummies can then parcel out the 
effects of these shocks if the latter are only partially captured by the macroeco- 
nomic variables we control for-GR,  DU, and INFL. Perhaps even more im- 
portant is the role of country-fixed effects. On the right-hand side of our regres- 
sions we have several political and institutional variables, which are arguably 
highly correlated with unobservable and time-invariant cultural and historical 
country-specific characteristics. If the latter also affect the rate of  growth of 
expenditure  and revenues,  it is extremely  important to control for country- 
fixed effects in order to eliminate this source of endogeneity bias. 
The first four columns of  table 4.2 display deficit and expenditure regres- 
sions with time-fixed effects only. This has rather drastic effects on the esti- 
mated  coefficients.  In the seventies, the coefficient of  NSM remains highly 
significant in both regressions, but its point estimate is cut to about a half. In 
the eighties, the coefficient of NPC falls much more drastically in both  size 
and significance, and it is now very far from being statistically significant. 
In the next four columns of table 4.2, only country-fixed effects are present. 
Now even the coefficient of NSM in the seventies becomes insignificant, while 
the coefficient of NPC in the eighties remains significant, although only in the 
deficit regression. 
These results clearly highlight the importance of controlling for time- and 
country-fixed effects in our regressions. From now on, all our regressions will 
include both. 
4.5.2  Outliers 
Before making  further inference  from the results  we have obtained, it is 
important to make sure that they are not unduly influenced by the inclusion of 
individual  countries,  always a real  possibility  in panels with  a small cross- 
sectional component like the present one. To address this issue, we started by 
reestimating all our regressions excluding one country at a time. The results of 
this procedure, reported in table 4.3, reveal a considerable difference between 
the robustness of the effects of cabinet size and coalition size. 
The first panel reports the maximum p-values of the coefficients of  NPC, 
DY*NPC, NSM, DY*NSM in the main regressions, the corresponding point 
estimate, and the country whose exclusion leads to the maximum p-value of 
that coefficient. From our previous analysis, we are particularly  interested in 
the coefficients involving cabinet size in the seventies, and the coefficients in- 
volving coalition size in the eighties. As one can see, no single country has an 
overwhelming influence on the coefficients and their significance. The exclu- Table 4.2  The Role of Time- and Country-Fixed Effects 
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Note: Columns 1 to 4: only year dummies; columns 5 to 8: only country dummies. See also note to table 4.1. Table 4.3  Sensitivity Analysis of the Country Sample 
Dependent variable  ADEF  AEXP  ADEF  AEXP 
Period  1974-83  1974-83  1984-95  1984-95 
Coefficient  NSM  NSM*DY  NSM  NSM*DY  NPC  NPC*DY  NPC  NPC*DY 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Maximum p-value, Individual Significance 
Coefficient estimate  .21  -  .02  .24  -  .01  .42  .oo  .22  -  .02 
Maximum p-value  0.10  0.07  0.01  0.61  0.02  0.36  0.11  0.52 
Country excluded  FRA  IRE  FRA  CHE  FIN  DNK  FIN  FIN 
Maximum p-value, Joint Significance 
Coefficient estimate  .19  -  .03  .24  -  .02  .42  -  .03  .22  -  .03 
Maximum p-value  0.05  0.02  0.07  0.33 
Country excluded  BEL  FRA  FIN  FIN 
Greece, Portugal, Spain, United States Excluded 
Coefficient estimate  .I8  -  .03  .I9  -  .02  .28  -  .02  .14  -  .02 
p-value  0.10  0.02  0.01  0.04  0.11  0.41  0.26  0.31 
p-value, joint  0.03  0.01  0.27  0.44 
Greece, Portugal Excluded 
Coefficient estimate  .20  ~  .03  .20  -  .02  .32  -  .03  .19  -  .03 
p-value, joint  0.02  0.00  0.14  0.17 
p-value  0.05  0.03  0.00  0.04  0.06  0.22  0.13  0.11 
Note: First panel: each column reports the maximum p-value (second line) and the corresponding point estimate (first line) of the coefficient indicated at the top of 
the column, out of the 19 regressions estimated by dropping one country at a time. The third line reports the country excluded. Second panel: same as in the first 
panel, except that the reported maximum p-value is that of a test of a joint significance of the two coefficients. Third panel: Greece, Portugal, Spain, and United States 
excluded. Fourth panel: Greece, Portugal excluded. See also note to table 4.1. 95  Government Fragmentation and Fiscal Policy Outcomes 
sion of France causes the p-value of the coefficient of NSM in the deficit re- 
gression of the seventies to become significant only at the 10 percent level, and 
so does the exclusion of Finland to the coefficient of NPC in the expenditure 
regression of  the eighties. But the coefficient of  NSM in the expenditure re- 
gression of the seventies and the coefficient of NPC in the deficit regression of 
the eighties are always well below the 5 percent significance level. The point 
estimates of the relevant coefficients are also remarkably close to the bench- 
mark estimates of table 4.2. 
The picture is slightly different for the interactive terms. The exclusion of 
just one country makes the coefficient of NSM*DY in column 4 or the coeffi- 
cient of NPC*DY in column 8 lose its statistical significance, with p-values of 
.61 and .52, respectively. Although we report only the highest p-value, corre- 
sponding to the exclusion of Finland, the interactive term NPC*DY becomes 
insignificant when just one of several other countries is excluded. 
Although the interactive terms do appear to be sensitive to the inclusion 
of  individual countries, one could argue that what matters is really the joint 
significance of the coefficients of the fragmentation variable and its interactive 
term. The second panel of table 4.3 reports maximum p-values for tests of the 
joint significance of the two coefficients listed at the top of the table, together 
with the associated excluded country. The coefficients of NSM and NSM*DY 
are always jointly significant, with a maximum p-value of  .05. By contrast, 
when Finland is excluded, the coefficients of NPC and NPC*DY have a joint 
significance level of  about .07 and .33 in the deficit and expenditure regres- 
sions. Thus, the analysis of  the joint significance gives a considerably more 
robust impression than the analysis of the individual coefficients. 
Recall that, in constructing our data set of  political and institutional vari- 
ables, for four countries-Greece,  Portugal, Spain, and the United States-we 
had to use a different source than for all the others. In addition, one could 
question the inclusion of the first three countries, on the ground that they were 
not democracies until the mid-l970s, and of the United States, on the ground 
that it is not a parliamentary regime and therefore the notion of coalition size 
is somewhat less clear cut. The criticism concerning Greece, Portugal, and 
Spain hardly applies to the regressions we have presented, since they cover the 
period  1974-95,  and therefore include very few years of  nondemocratic re- 
gime in these countries. However, the role of these countries still warrants fur- 
ther investigation, albeit for a different reason: the fiscal data of Greece and 
Portugal are widely regarded to be somewhat less reliable than those of  the 
other countries, particularly in the early part of the sample.'O 
When the basic benchmark regression is estimated without the four coun- 
tries (see the third panel of table 4.3), one finds that the coefficients of NSM 
and NSM*DY are robust, but once again the coefficients of NPC are much 
less so: both the coefficient estimates and their significance drop drastically. 
10. For instance, Portugal revalued its gold reserves in the mid-1970s. causing a large change 
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On further investigation, one finds that this result is mostly due to precisely 
the two countries mentioned  above: Portugal and Greece. It is sufficient to 
exclude these two countries (as in the last panel of table 4.3) for the p-value of 
NPC in both the expenditure and deficit regressions  to rise to .06 and .23, 
respectively,  and  for  the  p-value  for  the  joint  significance  of  NPC  and 
NPC*DY to rise to .14 and .17. 
Whether these are considered gross violations of the benchmark results with 
the whole sample is largely a subjective matter. Two countries represent more 
than 20 percent of the sample, and they might contain useful information that 
should not be wasted. Nevertheless, a conservative conclusion from this pre- 
liminary robustness analysis is that the role of cabinet size appears much more 
robust than the role of coalition size, in particular as concerns the asymmetric 
role of fragmentation in good and bad times. 
4.5.3 
In tables 4.4 and 4.5 we explore the robustness of our results to alternative 
constructions of the fiscal variables on the left-hand side. Some sensitivity to 
the specific construction of the dependent variables has emerged in the litera- 
ture on government weakness.Ii In addition, in a large part of the existing liter- 
ature the dependent variable is defined as the change in net or gross debt, rather 
than the deficit or its components. 
We start in table 4.4  by  considering three alternative constructions  of the 
aggregate expenditure variable on the left-hand side, and in all cases we focus 
on aggregate expenditure in the last two decades, where, as we have seen, most 
of the action is concentrated. In the first two columns the dependent variable 
is in levels, and we obviously control for the lagged value of the dependent 
variable on the right-hand side.12 Not surprisingly, given the very high persis- 
tence of the data, the coefficient of the latter is very close to 1, with only a 
marginal change in the coefficients of  the variables of interest, NSM in the 
seventies and NPC in the eighties. 
In the next two columns, the dependent variable is defined as the change in 
the real per capita values of expenditure divided by the previous year’s real per 
capita GDP. One advantage of this procedure is that it eliminates movements 
in the dependent variable that are due exclusively to changes in GDP. For in- 
stance, suppose in yearfthe government takes no action on expenditure. Still, 
if there is a fall in GDP, the change in the expenditure/GDP ratio would show 
a substantial increase in the dependent variable, although the government did 
not intend to make any change to its expenditure policy.i3 
Alternative Definitions of the Dependent Variables 
11. De Haan and Sturm (1994) survey these results. 
12. As is well known, including both a lagged dependent variable and country-fixed effects in 
panel regressions generates inconsistent estimates. We do not address this problem here. 
13. Because the numerator-particularly  when the variable in question is revenues-is  also 
sensitive to changes in GDP, this definition of the dependent variable makes even more sense when 
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Table 4.4  Sensitivity Analysis of the Expenditure Definition 
AEXP  AEXP  AEXP  AEXP  AEXP  AEXP 
1974-83  1984-95  1974-83  1984-95  1974-83  1984-95 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
NSM  .35 
(3.68) 
NPC*DY  .01 
(0.25) 
NSM*DY  -  .02 
(- 1.49) 
DY  -.32 
(- 1.89) 
DU  .08 
(0.49) 
INFL  -.13 
.04 
(0.30) 
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EXP,_,  .23  .8  1 
(24.19)  (30.21) 
R2  .99  .99  .32  .I7  .38 
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Note: Columns 1 and 2: dependent variable is level of  expenditures, EXP,, instead of first difference; 
columns 3 and 4: dependent variable is the change in the real, per capita values of expenditure divided by 
the previous real, per capita GDP  columns 5 and 6: dependent variable is the change in the logarithm of 
expenditures. See note to table 4.1. 
As one can see, once again the basic picture remains unchanged relative to 
the benchmark estimates of table 4.1, even though the coefficient of  NPC in 
the eighties is no longer significant at the 5 percent level. Exactly the same 
conclusion applies to the last two columns of table 4.4, where the dependent 
variable is defined as the change in the logarithms of  aggregate expenditure. 
Thus, overall table 4.4 confirms both the robustness of the coefficient of NSM 
in the seventies, and the picture of a somewhat less robust coefficient of NPC 
in the eighties. 
In table 4.5 the dependent variable is the change in the debt/GDP ratio. In 
principle, the overall budget deficit should correspond exactly to the change in 
net debt. In practice, the difference between the two measures can be substan- 
tial, for many reasons. One can argue that the change in net debt better captures 
the overall stance of  fiscal policy as it is actually realized, independently of 
how it is recorded in the official accounts. This is presumably the motivation 
for using this variable in Roubini and Sachs 1989a,b. On the other hand, one 
can also argue that the flow variable, the deficit, better captures the develop- 
ments in fiscal policy that are under the control of the current policymaker; for 
instance, the net debt differs from the deficit because of, among other things, 
changes in arrears. In addition, to evaluate net debt directly (rather than from 98  Yianos Kontopoulos and Roberto Perotti 
Table 4.5  Sensitivity Analysis of the Fiscal Deficit Definition 
ADEBT  ADEBT  ADEBT  ADEBT  ADEBT  ADEBT 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
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Note: Columns 1 to 3: dependent variable is change in the net debt/GDP ratio; columns 4 to 6:  dependent 
variable is change in the gross deht/GDP ratio. See also note to table 4.1. 
the flow) one must measure changes not only in liabilities but also in the assets 
of the government, often a highly speculative exercise, with the result that the 
amount of  noise is likely to be much higher than for the deficit. Finally, using 
the change in net debt rather than the deficit causes a drastic fall in the number 
of observations available for our regressions-a  total of 38 1 in the first column 
of  table 4.5, against the 641 of the deficit regression in the first column of 
table 4.1. 
In fact, when we use the change in the net debt/GDP ratio we find that the 
coefficients of both NPC and NSM lose all significance in the whole sample 
and in each of the last two decades (columns 2 and 3 of table 4.5). In view of 
our  previous  discussion,  we  believe  these  results  simply  suggest  that  one 
should not use the net debt/GDP  ratio as a dependent  variable  in this kind 
of regression. 
Some authors (e.g., de Haan and Sturm 1994) also use the change in the 
gross debt/GDP  ratio as dependent variable. The advantages of  this variable 
are that it is slightly more widely available than net debt, and especially that it 
avoids the type of measurement problems involved in any measure of govern- 
ment assets. On the other hand, the change in gross debt does not correspond 
to any meaningful variable under the control of the policymaker: theoretically, 
any change  in gross debt is consistent with a given deficit, and vice versa. 
Columns 4 to 6 of table 4.5 report estimates with the change in the gross debt/ 
GDP ratio as the dependent variable. We still find mostly insignificant coeffi- 99  Government Fragmentation and Fiscal Policy Outcomes 
cients everywhere, except the coefficient of NPC in the last decade, which is 
positive, significant, and extremely large. In fact, the point estimate is suspi- 
ciously large, which in our view reinforces our position on the problems with 
this variable. As an example, the OECD data on gross debt that we use imply 
a change in the gross debt/GDP ratio of  20.5 percent in 1993 in Finland, a 
figure that we find it hard to attribute any macroeconomic significance to since 
in the same year the measured budget deficit was only 5.8 percent of GDP. 
This and other similar values in the nineties in several countries contribute to 
the implausible estimate of  1.26 for the coefficient of NPC in the last decade. 
Once again, in view of the lack of theoretical motivation for the use of gross 
debt, and in view of the serious measurement problems it involves, we consider 
these results mostly as a warning against using this variable. 
4.5.4  The Definition of Difficult Times 
One novelty in our approach is a systematic investigation of the importance 
of political factors in periods of  macroeconomic distress. In the basic results 
of table 4.1 we found some support for the notion that fragmentation is a partic- 
ularly important determinant of  fiscal outcomes in difficult times. Table 4.6 
explores the robustness of this finding. 
In the first two columns, we interact NPC and NSM with a measure of the 
GDP gap rather than with the rate of growth of  GDP. This variable, provided 
by  the OECD, measures the percentage deviation of GDP from some measure 
of potential output. The results confirm the usual pattern-the  coefficients of 
NSM in the 1970s are much more robust than the coefficients of NPC in the 
1980s. In the former case, the interactive term if anything becomes more sig- 
nificant; in the latter case, both coefficients of NPC become insignificant. 
Columns 3 and 4 present a different specification.  We now divide the sample 
into “good” and “bad” times; the former are defined as years where growth 
was more than one standard deviation above the country-specific average; the 
latter as all other years. We then allow for a different coefficient for NSM and 
NPC in “bad” and in “good” times. The results broadly confirm our previous 
findings: in the expenditure regression in the 1970s, only NSM is significant, 
and there is virtually no difference in the coefficients of this variable in “bad” 
and “good” times. In the expenditure regression in the 1980s, the coefficient 
of NPC is significant only in bad times, confirming the earlier result that there 
seems to be a significant role of NPC in bad times. 
4.6  Conclusions 
Our main purpose in this chapter was go beyond existing investigations of 
the effects of political variables on fiscal outcomes by distinguishing and test- 
ing two alternative notions of fragmentation, which have equal theoretical sta- 
tus. To do so, we  strove to define all our variables quantitatively, so that we 
could measure them as objectively as possible. 100  Yianos Kontopoulos and Roberto Perotti 
Table 4.6  Sensitivity Analysis of the Definition of Difficult Times 
AEXP  AEXP  AEXP  AEXP 
1974-83  1984-95  1974-83  1984-95 
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0.34  0.05 
0.01  0.15 
.36  .36  .59  .59 
185  228  195  239 
Note: Columns 1 and 2: DY is the GDP gap from potential output, OECD definition; columns 3 and 4: 
GOOD is a dummy variable with a value of  1 for years with growth more than one standard deviation 
above the country-specific average; BAD is a dummy capturing all other years; columns 3 and 4: values 
in parentheses are probability values of the t-statistics. See note to table 4.1. 
Of the two notions, the first one is fairly traditional, although we measure it 
differently  from the  existing  literature  and  identify  fragmentation  with  the 
number of parties. The second is new in the literature and identifies fragmenta- 
tion with the number of spending ministers. 
Our empirical investigation reveals that this distinction was worthwhile: the 
number of spending ministers has a strong and very robust effect on expendi- 
ture,  particularly  during  the  period  that  includes  the  large macroeconomic 101  Government Fragmentation and Fiscal Policy Outcomes 
shocks of the seventies and early eighties. The number of parties in the coali- 
tion has also a statistically significant association with expenditure, but it ap- 
pears only in the last decade and it seems also to be far less robust. 
We believe our results are plausible and have one potentially important pol- 
icy implication. The size of  the ruling coalition is the result of  the electoral 
system and of the characteristics of  the whole political system; for these rea- 
sons, even if one found that coalition size is an important determinant of fiscal 
outcomes, realistically this finding would have limited policy implications be- 
cause its causes would be very hard to modify. 
By contrast, typically the number of spending ministers is not fixed in the 
constitution, and within certain limits it is unlikely to be a politically charged 
issue. In fact, in many circumstances reducing the number of spending minis- 
ters is likely to be a very popular move, with the public at large if not with the 
party apparatus. Thus, our findings suggest that reducing the number of  spend- 
ing ministers could be a feasible and even popular institutional reform with a 
potentially significant impact on expenditure. 
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